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Side channel effects such as temporal disparity and intensity fluctuation of photon pulses caused
by random bit generation with multiple laser diodes in high-speed polarization-based BB84 quantum
key distribution (QKD) systems can be eliminated by increasing DC bias current condition. How-
ever, background photons caused by the spontaneous emission process under high DC bias current
degrade the performance of the QKD systems. In this study, we investigated, for the first time, the
effects of spontaneously emitted photons on the system performance in a high-speed QKD system
at a clock rate of 400 MHz. Also, we further show improvements of system performance without
side channel effects by utilizing temporal filtering technique with real-time FPGA signal processing.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) system
provides availability of unconditionally secure key ex-
changes between two distant parties without fiber net-
work infrastructure. Polarization is normally adopted
as a physical observable for free-space QKD system and
it has been largely studied and demonstrated in diverse
situations such as moving platform [1], aircraft [2], long
distance [3], and daylight condition [4]. Recently, success-
ful distribution of entangled photon pairs over a distance
of 1200 km using quantum satellite [5] and satellite to
ground QKD [6] were reported, which arouses expecta-
tions that unconditionally secure bit exchanges through
a global network is feasible in the near future. However,
such unconditional quantum security is only guaranteed
under implementations where all components, both in
the sender and receiver, are properly operated without
any device loopholes [7–11].
In most free-space QKD systems, multiple semicon-
ductor lasers with passive optics are utilized to randomly
generate four different polarization states [1–6]. One of
the polarization states can be transmitted by turning on
one of the laser diodes exclusively for each time slot. We
recently reported on side channel effects in random bit
generation with multiple laser diodes in a polarization-
based QKD system [11]. In the above paper, we clearly
showed that the temporal position and intensity of the
photon pulses from each laser diode can be largely fluctu-
ated according to the time interval between consecutive
pulses from a single laser, the so called temporal dis-
parity and intensity fluctuation. Although this issue is
extremely critical in terms of the security of polarization-
based QKD system with multiple laser diodes, it has
not been clearly investigated because these effects are
not severe for speeds of operation of 100MHz or lower,
which are adopted in most representative free-space QKD
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demonstrations [1–4]. However, these side channel effects
apparently occur in high-speed QKD systems, especially
under the condition of low DC bias current injected into
laser diodes, due to the dynamics of the initial carrier
density and photon density. Since unconditional security
is threatened by the side channel effects, such effects must
be eliminated in the physical implementation, which can
be accomplished by increasing the the DC bias current
injected into the laser diodes. In this case, the perfor-
mance of the QKD system can be unavoidably degraded
due to the background photon noise from the sponta-
neous emission process of four laser diodes, especially for
high DC bias current condition.
In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate, for the
first time, the unavoidable performance degradation of
high-speed polarization-based BB84 [13] QKD system
with multiple laser didoes to eliminate the side chan-
nel effects. First, we demonstrated that it is possible
to achieve superior performance of the QKD system un-
der zero DC bias condition even for a clock speed of 400
MHz, which is several times faster than previous rep-
resentative free-space BB84 QKD demonstrations [1–5].
Second, we investigated how the side channels of tem-
poral disparity and intensity fluctuation under zero DC
bias current threaten the security of the system. Third,
we repeated the QKD experiments under high DC bias
current where the side channels are effectively closed.
We quantitatively measured how the background pho-
ton noises caused by the spontaneous emission process
under high DC bias current limits the performance of
the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and secure key rate.
Here, we showed that the photon counts by spontaneous
emission of laser diodes can be a dominant factor that
limits the performance of the high-speed system other
than the dark counts of single-photon detectors. In addi-
tion, we demonstrated that the system performance can
be significantly improved by using the temporal filtering
technique. Finally, we discussed some strategies towards
superior performance for high-speed QKD systems with-
out the aforementioned side channel effects.
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2FIG. 1. Experimental setup for measuring performance degradation of polarization-based BB84 QKD system under high DC
bias current. An example of aperiodic current signals generated from FPGA is depicted. FPGA; field programmable gate array,
LD; laser diode, Sync. LD; synchronization laser diode, Sync. PD; synchronization photodiode, DM; dichroic mirror, HWP;
half wave plate, ND filter; neutral density filter, PBS; polarization beam splitter, BS; beam splitter, PD; photo-detector, SPD;
single photon detector.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as fol-
lows. In sect. 2, the experimental setup to measure
the effects of DC bias current on the performance of the
QKD system is described. The experimental results of
the QBER and key rates when side channel effects are
neglected and eliminated are presented in sect. 3. In
addition, improvements of the system performance by
using the temporal filtering technique, as well as some
analysis, are presented. In sect. 4, further discussions
towards high-speed and high-performance polarization-
based QKD system are presented. Some concluding re-
marks are presented in sect.5.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The experimental setup to measure the effects of differ-
ent DC bias currents of laser diodes on the performance
of QKD system is shown in Fig. 1. We implemented a
polarization-based BB84 QKD system with four semi-
conductor laser diodes and passive optics such as beam
splitters, polarization beam splitters, half wave plates,
and neutral density filters. We randomly injected elec-
trical pulses to each laser diode as shown in Fig. 1, which
results in aperiodic current injection in terms of each laser
diode. Single longitudinal mode vertical-cavity surface-
emitting lasers (VCSELs) with a lasing wavelength of
787.5 nm were utilized for photon sources. We injected
electrical current pulses of 200 ps full width at half max-
imum (FWHM) to each laser diode to generate optical
pulses of 65 ps FWHM. Note that the optical pulse width
is smaller than that of the electrical pulse injection due
to the dynamics of large signal modulation with gain-
switching method [12]. The amplitude of current pulses
was controlled differently for different IDC , such that we
can generate similar optical pulses of 65 ps width where
IDC is the DC bias current injected into the laser diodes
as shown in the current pulse diagram in Fig. 1. The pho-
ton pulses were generated at a clock rate of 400 MHz and
attenuated to the mean photon number of 0.5. Note that
clock speed can be increased to a higher speed than 400
MHz considering the fact that the width of the optical
pulses is 65 ps. The clock signal for synchronization at
the wavelength of 1550 nm was combined with the quan-
tum signal using a dichroic mirror. A neutral density
filter with 10 dB attenuation was added for emulating
the channel loss.
The combined quantum signal and clock signal were
split through another dichroic mirror in the receiver.
The clock signal, which was recovered through a high-
speed photo-detector, was processed at the FPGA to
synchronize it with the quantum signal. Quantum sig-
nal detection was carried out with a four channel Si-
APD based single photon detector (PerkinElmer SPCM-
AQ4C) whose dark counts are lower than 500 counts/s
per channel and detection efficiency is approximately
50% at the wavelength of our laser diodes. The Bob’s sys-
tem loss, including optics loss and fiber coupling loss, was
measured as 2 dB. The sifting process of raw keys and es-
timation of the QBER were conducted with FPGA-based
real-time signal processing system. The QKD operation
was carried out in a dark room condition to effectively
eliminate other stray photons. Note that background
noise photons caused by the spontaneous emission pro-
cess of four laser diodes exist, which can differ according
to the level of IDC .
Detection probability distribution of the received sig-
nals is depicted in Fig. 2. Even though the transmit-
ted optical pulse width was approximately 65 ps, photon
detection events were temporally broadened to approxi-
mately 750 ps FWHM. Note that detection probability
distribution was unavoidably broader than the generated
3FIG. 2. Detection probability distribution of the received sig-
nals under IDC = 0.95Ith which was estimated at the FPGA
with a timing resolution of 125 ps. CSE represents the photon
counts by spontaneous emission process.
optical pulse width due to several factors, such as SPD
response jitter, clock signal jitter, and differential digital
data signal skews. In our system, most of the detection
events were covered within the temporal region of 1.5 ns.
It is natural to set IDC as zero because any non-
zero IDC generates spontaneously emitted photons for
all temporal regions. In other words, we should set IDC
as zero to turn on one of the four laser diodes exclu-
sively for each time slot, otherwise, the four laser diodes
always generate spontaneously emitted photons, which
can definitely increase quantum bit error rates. Here,
we measured QBER and key rates at IDC = 0, which is
the condition in which the output photons from spon-
taneous emission are negligible. We repeated the ex-
periment with IDC = 0.95Ith, which is the minimum
IDC level of our VCSELs, to eliminate temporal dispar-
ity and intensity fluctuation at a clock rate of 400 MHz.
For IDC = 0.95Ith, we investigated how the performance
of the QKD system is degraded due to the detrimen-
tal effects of spontaneously emitted photons. We further
attempted the temporal filtering technique limiting the
signal time window of photon detection events to im-
prove the system performance of the QBER and secure
key rate. The valid signal window by temporal filtering
was resized from 2.5 ns to 0.5 ns with the resolution of
0.25 ns to filter out background photon noises.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. QKD operation without considering the side
channel effects
The side channel effects which occurred in our sys-
tem at a clock rate of 400 MHz for the condition with
IDC = 0, are shown in Fig. 3 (a). The optical pulses
described in Fig. 3 (a) represent the second pulses out
of any two consecutive pulses for different time inter-
vals from a single laser diode. The time position of the
second pulses are depicted with respect to the current
pulse injection to investigate temporal disparity among
the second pulses. Here, time t represents the expected
time position of the output pulses. As described in [11],
the pulses are temporally distinguishable depending on
time intervals between two consecutive pulses, which can
significantly endanger the system security if Eve utilizes
previously known attack strategies accordingly [17, 18].
In addition, intensity fluctuation yields the degradation
of security performance of BB84 QKD even for decoy-
state QKD systems [19–21]. Thus, such side channels
must be eliminated to guarantee the security of the QKD
system.
Any QKD system without considering such side chan-
nel effects may be wrongly interpreted as unconditionally
secure one with superior QBER and key rates because the
security loophole from such side channel effects are not
reflected on the performance parameters such as QBER
and sifted key rates. The performances of the QKD sys-
tem for IDC = 0 are shown in Fig. 3 (b) and Fig. 3
(c). In this case, QBER of 1.04% and key rate of 1.213
Mbps were achieved at a signal window of 2.5 ns even
without implementing the temporal filtering technique.
We verified that the QBER can be decreased to approxi-
mately 0.56% by resizing the signal window down to 0.5
ns as shown in Fig. 3 (b). Here, reducing signal window
alleviates the effects of QBER caused by system jitter
and clock drift. Also, detection events by dark counts
of the SPD itself are eliminated as the signal window
decreases. The impact of downsizing on the sifted key
rates was imperceptible in the signal window range of 2
to 2.5 ns as shown in Fig. 3 (c), because most signal pho-
tons exist within the range of 2 ns as shown in Fig. 2.
Further downsizing yielded some reduction in the sifted
keys, which became significant when the size was smaller
than 1 ns. The secure key rate was calculated with the
assumption of the decoy method [14, 15] using the fol-
lowing simple equation [16].
R ≈ q
{
− ηµf(edet)H2(edet)+ ηµe−µ[1−H2(edet)]},
(1)
where q is the sifting ratio, µ is the mean photon number,
η is the transmittance, edet is the QBER, f
(
edet
)
is the
error correction coefficient for given edet, and H2
(
edet
)
is
the Shannon entropy where H2
(
edet
)
= −edetlog2(edet)−
(1 − edet)log2(1 − edet). Here, we used 1.22 for f
(
edet
)
.
The optimal window size in terms of the secure key rate
was approximately 2.25 ns as shown in Fig. 3 (c), where
the secure key rate was recorded as 1.222 Mbps. Even
though the system achieved superior performance param-
eters of QBER and key rates, however, the security of the
QKD under IDC = 0 can be threatened due to the afore-
mentioned side channel effects of temporal disparity and
intensity fluctuation.
4FIG. 3. Side channel effects and the performance of the QKD system under IDC = 0. (a) Side channel effects of temporal
disparity and intensity fluctuation. Second pulses out of two consecutive pulses in a 1 s time block are measured for different
time intervals from 2.5 ns to 40 ns. Details of the measurement methods are described in [11]. (b) QBER as a function of
signal window by temporal filtering. The signal window was resized from 2.5 ns to 0.5 ns with the resolution of 0.25 ns. (c)
Sifted key rate and secure key rate as functions of the signal window by temporal filtering.
B. QKD operation considering the side channel
effects
The side channel effects were eliminated under IDC =
0.95Ith as shown in Fig. 4 (a). Pulses with different in-
tervals between consecutive pulses are temporally over-
lapped and the intensity fluctuation becomes negligible.
Thus, we can ensure that the side channels are elim-
inated under IDC = 0.95Ith. However, when IDC is
increased close to the lasing threshold level Ith of the
laser diodes, the QBER can be increased owing to the
enhanced amount of background noise photons due to
the spontaneous emission process.
While the QBER was estimated around 1.04% un-
der IDC = 0, it was increased up to 2.67% under
IDC = 0.95Ith as shown in Fig. 4 (b). The excess QBER
was mostly due to the spontaneously emitted noise pho-
tons from the four laser diodes, which were always gen-
erated even for unallowed time slots, due to the rel-
atively high IDC as shown in the left part of Fig. 1.
Here, the spontaneously emitted noise photons under the
IDC = 0.95Ith condition become a dominant factor lim-
iting the QBER performance, considering the fact that
1.63% out of 2.67% QBER is caused by the increase of
IDC from 0 to 0.95Ith.
The probability of the detection counts due to sponta-
neously emitted photons CSE are shown in Fig. 2. Here,
temporal filtering evidently improved the QBER perfor-
mance as the signal window decreases from 2.5 ns to
1.5 ns because CSE outside the signal window is effec-
tively eliminated. In such signal windows, the sifted
key rate was slightly diminished, which allowed a higher
gain of the final secure key rate as shown in Fig. 4 (c).
For the signal windows smaller than 1.5 ns, however,
the QBER performance was not significantly improved
because temporal filtering reduces not only background
photon noises, but also true signals, which significantly
reduces the sifted key rate. Note that most of the re-
ceived signals were covered within approximately 1.5 ns
as shown in Fig. 2. For our QKD system, the measured
optimal signal windows in terms of the final secure key
rate for IDC = 0.95Ith was approximately 1.75 ns, where
the QBER was 1.51% with the sacrifice of the detection
events of 6.4% . Here, the secure key rate was recorded
as 1.037 Mbps. Further reduction of the signal window
should be discouraged due to too much elimination of sig-
nal photons, which diminishes the final secure key rate.
One can easily check that the condition of IDC =
0.95Ith degrades the performance of QBER and key rate
compared with IDC = 0 case. The final secure key
rate without temporal filtering was decreased from 1.213
Mbps to 0.856 Mbps, which indicates a 29.4% drop in
the secure key rate. However, a high IDC condition is
indispensable to close the side channels especially for a
high-speed polarization based QKD system with multiple
lasers. Under such condition, we can increase the secure
key rate from 0.856 Mbps to 1.037 Mbps using tempo-
ral filtering, which indicates a 21.1% improvement in the
secure key rate.
IV. DISCUSSION
Many previously known side channels of QKD systems
can be easily avoided through simple countermeasures
or simple monitoring methods without degradation of
the system performance [7–10]. However, the tempo-
ral disparity and intensity fluctuation caused by random
bit generation using multiple semiconductor laser diodes
cannot be avoided without sacrificing the QBER perfor-
mance, especially for high-speed BB84 QKD systems. Al-
though the temporal filtering technique is definitely an
effective method to improve the performance as demon-
strated in the previous sections, there can be other pos-
5FIG. 4. Side channel effects and performance of the QKD system under IDC = 0.95Ith. (a) Side channel effects of temporal
disparity and intensity fluctuation. Second pulses out of two consecutive pulses in a 1 s time block were measured for different
time intervals from 2.5 ns to 40 ns. Details of the measurement methods are described in [11]. (b) QBER as a function of
signal window by temporal filtering. The signal window was resized from 2.5 ns to 0.5 ns with the resolution of 0.25 ns. (c)
Sifted key rate and secure key rate as functions of the signal window by temporal filtering.
FIG. 5. Spectral characteristics of photon pulses for different
DC bias and AC pulse conditions.
sible strategies to alleviate the increase of the QBER as
follows.
One of the differences between spontaneously emitted
and stimulated emitted photons is the spectral character-
istics as shown in Fig. 5. We measured the spectrum for
three cases of {IDC , IAC} for {0.95Ith, 0}, {0.95Ith, IAC},
and {0, IAC}. Note that IDC = 0.95Ith generates spon-
taneously emitted photons and AC pulse generates stim-
ulated emitted photons. In a single longitudinal mode
laser diode, most of the stimulated output photons are
generated at a single wavelength as shown in Fig. 5. On
the other hand, photons by spontaneous emission shows
broad spectral characteristics [12]. We can easily ob-
serve that the power of the sidebands is higher under
IDC = 0.95Ith than under IDC = 0. On the other hand,
sidebands become negligible for IDC = 0 as shown in
the dotted line in Fig. 5. Therefore, we can eliminate
sidebands caused by high IDC by utilizing an ultra-sharp
spectral band pass filter, which mostly function as noise
photons.
Reducing system jitter is another strategy to improve
the performance. The QBER caused by the spontaneous
emission process can be continuously decreased as we
carry out more temporal filtering, as shown in Fig. 4 (a).
If the system jitter including the SPD response jitter be-
comes smaller such that the received signal distribution
becomes significantly narrower than that of our system,
we can effectively decrease the QBER without sacrificing
signal counts, which increases the final secure key rate.
For our system, most of the jitter occurred at the stage
of the single photon detection response.
V. CONCLUSION
In this study, we experimentally demonstrated for the
first time that the noise photons by spontaneous emis-
sion of multiple lasers, other than dark counts of the
SPDs or system errors, can be a dominant factor limit-
ing QBER performance in a high-speed of 400 MHz QKD
operation considering the side channel effects of temporal
disparity and intensity fluctuation. We showed that the
performance of the secure key rate of the QKD system
decreased from 1.213 Mbps to 856 kbps owing to the in-
crease of QBER performance due to photon noise from
the spontaneous emission process, which is non-negligible
under 0.95Ith. We showed that the secure key rate of 856
kbps can be improved up to 1.037 Mbps by utilizing the
temporal filtering technique, which should be considered
as a desirable prerequisite for high-speed QKD systems
with multiple laser diodes. In addition, we briefly dis-
cussed that using an ultra-sharp band pass filter and re-
ducing system jitter can be effective techniques to achieve
6superior system performance.
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